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SECTION ONE

FIRST DAY

VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Norfolk, Virginia - February 26, 2008
You MUST write your answer to Questions 1 and 2 in WHITE Answer Booklet A

On January 15, 2008, following an earlier bench trial, Judge A.J. Wisdom, the newest
judge of the Circuit Court of Fairfax Cowity, Virginia issued a letter opinion explaining his rationale
for ruling in favor of Plaintiff and directing that Plaintiffs counsel prepare an order to reflect the
trial court's holding as set forth in his letter. On January 16, 2008, Defendant' s cowisel filed a
motion for reconsideration of the letter opinion. The hearing on Defendant's motion was set for
February 1, 2008.
1.

At the outset of the hearing on February 1, and before the commencement of the argument on
Defendant's motion, Plaintiff s counsel submitted a typed order reflecting the Court's January 15,
2008 letter opinion. The pertinent text of the order read:
And it appearing to the Court for the reasons stated in the Court's
letter opinion, dated January 15, 2008, a copy of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein, that judgment should be entered m
favor of Plaintiff in the amoW1t of $275,000;
Now, therefore, it is SO ORDERED.
And, nothing further remaining to the done in this action, it also is
ORDERED that this action be placed among the closed files of this
Court.
Counsel for both parties endorsed the above Order, with Defendant's counsel noting hi s
objection. Judge Wisdom initialed each page and signed the Order, and the Clerk's office of the
Circuit Court entered the Order on the Court's docket on that same day, February 1.
The oral arguments on Defendant's motion for reconsideration then proceeded, and at the
conclusion thereof, on that same morning, Judge Wisdom stated orally from the bench, and without
taking any further action at that time, that he was granting Defendant' s motion for reconsideration
and would issue a letter opinion in the near future.
On February 25, 2008, Judge Wisdom issued a second letter opinion, articulating his reasons
for changing his mind and deciding the entire case in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff -- a
result that was directly opposite to that set forth in the fust letter opinion. Judge Wisdom asked that
Defendant's counsel prepare, circulate, and submit an order reflecting the February 25, 2008 letter
opinion.
In a telephone discussion between counsel on February 26, Plaintiff's attorney told
Defendant's attorney that Plaintiff would take action to preserve the earlier result in her favor.
Defendant's attorney opined that Judge Wisdom's February 25 letter opinion was entirely proper and
cited Code of Virginia§ 8.0 1-428 in support of his position. That Code section states:
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Clerical mistakes in all judgments or other parts of the
record and enors therein arising from oversight or an
inadvertent omission may be conected by the court at
any time on its own initiative or upon the motion of any
party and, after such notice, as the court may order.

(a)

What authority can Plaintiff bring to bear to preserve the earlier result in her
favor, and what is the likely outcome? Explain fully.

(b)

Is Defendant's reliance on Code of Virginia§ 8.01-428, recited above, likely to
prevail against Plaintiff's effort to preserve the earlier result in her favor?
Exp lain fully.

(c)

If Defendant is concerned that the Court might restore its February 1 Order in
Plaintiff's favor, what steps should Defendant take to preserve his right to
challenge it, and what are the immediate requirements for taking such steps?
Explain fully.

Reminder: You MUST answer Question #1 above in the WHITE Booklet A

* * * * *

2.
Mary and George, residents of Suffolk, Virginia, had been married for 20 years.
They had no children by their marriage. George had a son, Wilbur, by a previous marriage, and,
although Wilbur and George had a close relationship, Mary and Wilbur never got along. In 2000,
George and Mary executed valid wills, each leaving their substantial estates to the other. To please
George, Mary provided in her will that, if George predeceased her, upon her death her entire estate
would go to Wilbur.
George died in 2005. From then until Mary's death in January 2008, Mary and Wilbur had
no communication, and Mary lived alone with her cats. In December 2007, upon finding a copy of
her 2000 will, which she had long forgotten, Mary mailed the following letter to the attorney who
had prepared the 2000 will and retained the original in his office. The letter was entirely in her own
handwriting and signed by Mary.

Dear Counselor:
I want to meet with you as soon as possible. I am
now canceling the will you wrote for me in 2000, and I
am writing a new one. I do not want George's son, whose
name I have forgotten, to have any of my property when
I die. I have a very large estate, and I know George wanted
to see that his son was taken core of, but I have never
gotten along with him, and he has pa id no attention to me
at all. Since I hove no living relatives, I wont to leave my
entire estate to the Stray Cats Society (SCS). As you may
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recall, I am a cat-lover, and I served on the SCS Board of
Directors until recently and, before that, on the Board of
Directors of The Kat Doktor (TKO). Both are wonderful
nonprofit organizations that take care of homeless cats, but
I believe SCS has a better program.
I am somewhat feeble, so I find it hard to get out
of the house. Please call me so we can set up time when
you can come to my home and write up a formal document.
/s/ MOJy
December 30, 2007
Mary died on January 5, 2008, before her attorney was able to m eet with her. Her 2000 will
and the December 30, 2007 letter were presented for probate. In the meantime, SCS had suffered
financial setbacks and had gone out of business. Another nonprofit organization named Critter Care
(CC), which cares for a variety of derelict animals, not just cats, took over the care of about half of
the cats SCS had been caring for, and TKD took over the care of the remaining cats.
In the probate proceedings, Wilbur asserts the following claims: (1) that the December 30
letter is ineffective to dispose of Mary's estate; (2) that the December 30 letter does not revoke
Mary's 2000 will; and (3) that he has the right to Mary 's entire estate either under the terms of her
2000 will or by intestacy.
TDK and CC each petition the court to be substituted in place of the def"unct SCS and claim
the right to receive all or part of Mary's estate under the terms of the December 30, 2007 letter.

What arguments should W ilbur, TKD and CC make in support of the claims they each
assert, and how should th e court resolve each claim? Explain fully.

Reminde r: You MUST answer Questio n #2 above in the WHITE Booklet A

* * * **
~~

Now MOVE to the YELLOW Answer Booklet 8

~~

You MUST write your answer to Questions 3 a nd 4 i n YELLOW Answer Booklet B
3.
Gordon, a 13-year-old resident of Phoebus, Virginia, and his parents went on a family
hiking trip along Skyline Drive in Virginia. Before leaving, they had made reservations for an
overnight stay at a motel called the Waynesboro Mountain Inn ("WMI"). They had never heard of
WMI before.

Shortly after checking in to WMI, Gordon slipped on the sidewalk where water draining
from an air conditioner had been allowed to accumulate and broke his leg. As a result, he was
permanently disabled.
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WMI, which is solely owned and operated by an individual named Quinn, is one of 500
Mountain Inns nationwide. Each Mountain Inn is a franchise owned by individual businesspersons
and operated under a uniform franchise agreement between the individual and Mountain Inns
Corporation ("MIC"). MIC has a website on which requirements for qualifying as a franchisee and
the uniform franchise agreement can be conveniently viewed.
The key provisions of the uniform franchise agreement signed by Quinn provide ( 1) that the
location, plans, and specifications of each motel be approved by :MIC; (2) that Quinn pay an annual
fee to support MIC's national advertising network, (3) that MIC must approve the sale or other
disposition of a controlling interest in WMI before any transfer can occur, ( 4) that W:MI's manager,
housekeeper, and restaurant manager receive two weeks training by :MIC at the commencement of
their employment, (5) that Quinn conduct the business under the MIC "system," (6) that Quinn make
quarterly reports to MIC concerning his financial operations, and (7) that Quinn submit to once-ayear inspections of WMI facilities and procedures by :MIC representatives. Quinn scrupulously
complied with those provisions of the uniform franchise agreement.
Gordon' s parents retained Alvin, a local attorney , to represent them and Gordon in a personal
injury suit to recover damages for Gordon's injuries. A brochure that Gordon's parents had obtained
at the WMI described the W:MI as, "Owned and operated by Quinn, W:MI is one of a chain of 500
fine Mountain Inns across the country. For more information see wvvw.mountaininns.com."
Alvin surmised that he would have a better chance of obtaining a large settlement or
judgment by suing :tvfIC rather than Quinn. Without doing any research or further investigation into
the relationship between Quinn and MIC, Alvin signed and filed a complaint in Circuit Court
naming MIC as the sole defendant. The complaint alleged that, "Gordon' s injury was the result of
the negligence of Quinn, the agent of MIC acting on behalf of and under the direction and control of
MIC."
MIC filed an answer to the complaint, denying all liability. MIC also filed a motion for
sanctions against Alvin for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
(a)

Should MIC be held liable for the negligence of Quinn? Explain fully.

(b)

On what basis, if any, might the court impose sanctions on Alvin? Explain fully.

Reminder: You MUST answer Question #3 above in YELLOW Booklet B

* * * * *
4.
Angus, a resident of Chilhowie, Virginia, made a loan of $25,000 to his nephew, Bob.
Angus prepared a draft of a promissory note, which, in addition to standard language of a
promissory note, contained the following terms:

1. This note is payable so long as no earthquake measuring more than 3.0 on the Richter
scale hits Chilhowie, Virginia during the term of this note.

2. The principal amount of this note is $25,000 or its equivalent in Euros as of the due date.
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3. This note is payable to the order of Angus or any other person.
4. This princir,al balance of this note, together with accrued interest is due on the earlier of
Angus' 70t 1 birthday (July 4, 2015) or on the date upon which the Chicago Cubs baseball
team wins the World Series.
Angus wants the note to be fully negotiable, but is concerned that one or more of these
specific terms might make the note non-negotiable.

Discuss separa tely each of the fo ur enumerated term s, and explain fully as to each:
(a) W hether, as stated, the term would m ake the n ote non-negotiable;
(b) If not, why the term would n ot destroy negotiability; and
(c) If so, why and what language would h ave to be deleted from the term in order to
preserve negotiability.
Reminder: You MUST answer Question #4 above in YELLOW Booklet B

* * * *
~~

Now MOVE to

*

Ian Answer Booklet C

~~

You MUST write your answer to Question 5 in Tan Answer Booklet C
5.
In October 2007, Petula Jones took a six-month leave of absence from her job in
Ashland, Kentucky, where she resided. She traveled to Gate City, Virginia and moved into a spare
room in her mother' s house so she could care for her elderly mother, who was recuperating from an
extended illness. In Decem ber 2007, Petula was walking to her car in the parking lot of the City
Mall in Gate City when she was struck by an automobile driven by Ruby Smith, a resident of
Kingsport, Tennessee. Thr.ee fri ends of Ruby from Kingsport were in the car at the time of the
accident. They were just \vrapping up a shopping tour and preparing to return to Kingsport. City
Mall is a Delaware corporation and has its principal place of business in Gate City, Virginia.
Ruby' s passengers told the police officer at the scene that Petula was reading a magazine as
she walked across the parking lot and darted out from behind a concrete column at the time of the
accident. They also said that Petula was not watching where she was going. Petula told the police
that her view was blocked when Ruby' s car struck her because she had just walked out from behind
a large concrete colw1m supporting the upper level of the parking lot.
Petula sued Ruby and City Mall in the Big Stone Gap Division of the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Virginia, which is the district in which Gate City is located. Big Stone Gap
is 35 miles from Gate City. Petula's comp laint alleged negligent operation of a vehicle against Ruby
and negligent maintenance of the parking lot against City Mal1. She sought $60,000 in damages for
personal injuries against Ruby. Against City Mall, Petula sought an inj unction ordering City Mall to
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tear down the concrete support column, which she alleged was a safety hazard.
City Mall moved to dismiss Petula's complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject
matter jmisdiction. At the hearing on City Mall ' s motion, the court received probative evidence that,
if granted, the injunction would require City Mall to spend in excess of $ 100,000 to comply with it.
The court denied the motion.
Ruby then moved for a change of venue of the action to a U. S. District Court in Tennessee
on the grounds that (1) venue in the Western District of Virginia is improper and (2) she is a citizen
of Tennessee and it would be a hardship for her and her witnesses to travel to Virginia for trial. The
court denied Ruby' s motion for a change of venue.
Ruby then filed a notice of appeal to the lower court' s denial of her venue motion to the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed Ruby ' s appeal.

(a)

'\'as the district court correct in denying the motion of City Mall to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the court la cked subj ect matter jurisdiction?
Explain fully.

(b)

Was the district court cor rect in denying Ruby's motion fo r ch an ge of venue on
each of the two grounds? Explain fully.

(c)

Was the Court of Appeals correct in dismissing Ruby's appeal? Explain fully.

Note: You may assume that the claim for injunction against City Mall is properly p leaded. Do
not discuss the merits of whether th e cour t could or should grant th e injunction.
Reminder: You MUST answer Question #5 above in Tan Booklet C

* * * * *
END OF SECTION ONE

